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In this note we investigate, for non-convex finite economies, the relationship between the 
existence of approximate core allocations and the size of an economy. 
1. Introduction 
The existence of approximate equilibria for exchange economies whose 
agents have non-convex preferences was established by Starr (1969). For 
a stronger concept of approximate equilibria the existence result was 
obtained by Hildenbrand, Schmeidler and Zamir (1973) (HSZ hereafter). 
Moreover, it was shown in HSZ, that the approximation can be made as 
good as one likes by choosing the number of agents in the economy large 
enough. 
Under assumption of completeness of preferences, the analogous 
existence result for approximate cores was also obtained in HSZ. In a 
consequent paper Grodal(l976) has extended this result to the non-com- 
plete case. 
In a recent contribution Anderson (1982) proved a ‘rate-of-conver- 
gence’ theorem for approximate equilibria in the framework of quite 
general sequences of finite exchange economies, including those se- 
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quences considered in HSZ. A special case of Anderson’s result was 
proved subsequently by Weber (1980) for the sequences of HSZ by 
modifying arguments given already there. 
In this note we establish a relationship between the existence of 
approximate core allocations and the size of a non-convex economy. The 
result is directly related to the previous papers by HSZ and Grodal 
(1976). 
To obtain our proposition the only additional assumption we need is a 
cone-monotonicity of preference relations which is defined below. 
2. Model 
We follow HSZ very closely, and all notations, assumptions and 
definitions, except of C-monotonicity, are reproduced from there. 
Let T denote an infinite set of potential traders. For every t E T there 
are defined: 
(9 a preference relation +, on the positive orthant R’+ of the I-dimen- 
sional Euclidean space R’( I >, 2) 
(ii) a vector of the initial endowment w, in R’+\(O). 
We assume that: 
A.]. For all t E T, >, is irreflexive, transitive, open [the set {(x, _y) E 
R’, x R’+]x >,y} is open in the relative topology of R: X R:], and 
strongly monotone (x E Rk , u E R’+\(O) implies x + u t ,x). 
A.2. Uniform boundedness of initial endowments. There is a positive real 
number M such that w, < Me for all t in T, where e denotes the unit 
vector (l,..., 1)~ R’. 
A.3. Compactness of preferences. The set { +,),=r is compact. [For a 
precise definition of the topology on the set of preferences see HSZ (p. 
1164). It is shown there, for example, that the set of all irreflexive, 
transitive, open, and monotone preferences is compact with respect to 
this topology.] 
Now, let C c R’ be a proper cone such that int C 1 R:\(O). [Recall 
that C is a proper cone if (i) C + C c C, (ii) XC c C for all X > 0, (iii) 
C n (- C) = (0). Cf. Shaefer (1966).] 
Defi~~i~ion 1. A preference relation on R(+ is C-monotone at x f RI+ if 
[u E C\(O), x + u E R’+] implies [x + u >- x]. A preference relation is 
C-monotone on a set A c R!+ if it is C-monotone at x for every x E A. A 
preference relation is C-monotone if it is C-monotone on R\ . 
Now denote for any X E (0, 1) and i E { 1,2,. . . ,I } the vector 
i 
-x ,...) -h, 1 ) -A ,...) -A 
t 
i th place I 
by ei. Then Cx denotes the convex cone generated by the set {O,ek, 
ez,. . . ,ei}. Note that there is X E (0, 1) such that C 3 CA. 
We denote by S the open simplex 
p= (p’,..., 1 and p’> 0 for all i 
i 
in R\. The demand correspondence 4: T x S * RI.+ is defined 
+(t,p)= {x~Ln]px~pw, and y>,x implies py>pw,}. 
It is shown in Schmeidler (1969) that II/ is well defined and, by the 
monotonicity assumption, px =pw, holds for all x in $(f, p). An ex- 
change economy is by definition a finite subset, say E, of T. An allocation 
for the economy E is a collection {x, },EE of elements of R: satisfying 
E:rGE(X, - w,) = 0. 
In order to state our proposition we need the following: 
Definition 2. Let e > 0 and an economy E be given. Then the e-core of E 
is defined to be the set of all allocations {x, },EE, such that there do not 
exist a non-empty subset S of E and an allocation { J,~YI)(~~ for E 
satisfying 
(i) yt >tx, for every r E S, 
(ii) Crts~, G GEsw,)@ISI=. 
(]A] denotes the cardinality of a set A, and for any x, y E R!+ the vector 
whose j th coordinate is max{ 0, x J - y’} for all 1 <j 6 1 is denoted x8y.) 
Proposition. Let A.l-A.3 be satisfied and S > 0. Suppose that for any 
n E N there is II X, > 0 so that euety +, is C,,n-monotone on [0, n]‘. Then for 
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any sequence of economies in T with C,, E,w, > 1 E,,ISe for each n, there are 
sequences { { x:},~~,,},,~~ of allocations and { c,,},,=~ of positive numbers 
with en = O(l/lE,,I), such that { x:},~~, E c,-core of E, for every n E N. 
3. Preliminary statements and proof of the proposition 
Let us state the following lemma, which is useful for the proof of the 
proposition: 
Lemma. Let 8 > 0. Under assumptions A.l-A.3, for any sequence 
{En IntN of economies in T with CIGE .w, > I E,, 16e for each n, there are 
sequences ({x: I1=c,, P’),~~ of allocations and of prices in S, such that for 
each n E N and each t E E, one has p”x: =p”w, and p(x:, #(t,p”))= 
O(l/lE,I). (For x E Rt and A c R’, p(x, A) denotes inf,,,, II x -y II). 
This Lemma due to Weber (1980) is a corollary of Theorem 2 in 
Anderson (1982). 
Consider the following two statements concerning an irreflexive pref- 
erence relation > : 
(i) for every x,y,x’,y’ E R’+ : y 2 x,y:x, II y - y’ II < II y - x II /K and II x 
-x’II < Ily-xI~/Kay’>x’. 
(ii) > is C,-monotone. 
Then we can state: 
Claim I. (i) implies that (ii) holds for every X < l/(1 - l)(fiK + 1). 
Claim 2. (ii) implies that (i) holds for K > 4fi/X. 
Proof of Claim 1. Assume (i) is satisfied and consider x E Rt+, u E C,\ 
{0}, where h < l/(1- l)(fiK + 1). Then, u = Cf,,G,ei for some S, >, 0. 
Leti3=max _ , t . ...,, 6, > 0. Now definey’ = x + u and assume thaty’ E Rt+ . 
We have to prove that y’ > x. Therefore define v E Rt+ by v, = max(O, 6, 
--X&+,6,) for i= l,..., I and let y = v + x. Then, IIY - x II = II u II >, S 
- X(1 - 1)6. Moreover 
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Since X G l/(1 - l)( Kfi + l), we have that 
Consequently, as y 2 x, we have by (i) that x + u r x. Q.E.D. 
Proof of Claim 2. Assume (ii) and consider x, y, x’, y’ E R!+ such 
y#.x, y>x, and max(tly-y’II, IIX-X’II)<II~-XII/K, where 
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that 
K> 
44//X. It suffices to show that y - 3 E C,, where y’ := y( - II~ - x II 
/K)(L..., l), X’ := x + (II y - x II /K)(l, 1,. . . ,l) (clearly y’ > y’ and X’ 
> x’). Note that y > x implies that y, > x,, for all 1 < h < I, and there 
exists i, 1 < i < I, such that y, > x, + II y - x II/J~. Therefore, we have 
that y’ > 2’ + (II y - x 11/d)(0, 0,. . . ,l, 0,. . . , 0) - 2(ll y - x It 
/K)(i,. . . , 1). Let 
Ily - x II -4fi 
24= 
2fi ( K 
,..., ,..., 
Consider u E R’. where 
-45 -44 -4J7 - - ,..., 
K ’ K ““’ K ’ 
Since 4&/K < X < 1, we conclude that u E C,\ (0). Consequently, since 
_v’ > X’ + u > X’ + (II y - x ll/2fi)u, it follows that y’ - 2’ E C,. As, 
moreover, y’ E R!+ and y’ # x’, we obtain that y’ Y- x’.- Q.E.D. 
Proof of the proposition. Let S > 0 and let a sequence of economies 
{%)ncNwith&E, W, > 1 E,, ISe be given. Then, by the lemma, there exist 
an independent constant H and sequences {{x: lIEEm, pn }ncN of alloca- 
tions and prices, so that for each n E N and each t E E,, one has 
p”x: =p”w, and p(x:, $(t,p”))< (Y,,, where (Y, = H/IE,I. Let 9 = 77(6/2) 
be determined by Lemma 2 of HSZ. Denote by Q a minimal integer, 
which exceeds M/2. Let B be a cube [O,Q]’ and X, > 0, so that each 
preference relation >, , t E T, is a C,o-monotone on B. 
Consider an economy E,,, which belongs to the above sequence of 
economies. Suppose x, y, x’, y’ E R\, y > x, lly - x II = (4fi/~p)a,. 
Then by Claim 2, max( 11 x - x’ II , II y - y’ II) < a,, implies that y’ >I~’ for 
any tE E,. Denote j3, = (4\/7/Xa)aR and en = 2&/77(6/2) = 
(2/17(6/2))(4J7/X,)(H/IE,I). 
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Thus, applying the standard arguments used in Grodal (1976) we 
conclude that an economy E, has a non-empty en-core, and this com- 
pletes the proof of proposition. Q.E.D. 
Remark. Let us note, that although for any h > 0 every CA-monotone 
preference relation is strongly monotone, but for given h > 0, a strongly 
monotone preference relation cannot, in general, be approximated by a 
sequence of C-,-monotone preference relations. This can be illustrated by 
the following: 
Example. Let x>O. Define > on R\ by x+y=x-y~intCx,~. 
(Clearly, > is strongly monotone.) Consider a sequence ( tn)ntN of 
C-,-monotone preference relations and for each n E N denote Gr( > ,,) := 
((~9 y)lx +,y, x E R: > PER:}. Then [x,y~R’+,x-yfzCX, x#y] 
implies that [x >,y, tin E N]. Moreover, Gr( >,) I {(x, y)]x -y E C-, 
\{O],Y E R: > x E R:} for all n and since RL X R: \Gr( + .) is closed 
we have that (t,,) does not converge to s . 
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